REMEDIAL READING: EVALUATING FEDERAL COURTS’ APPLICATION
OF THE PREJUDICE STANDARD IN CAPITAL SENTENCES FROM
“WEIGHING” AND “NON-WEIGHING” STATES
Sarah Gerwig-Moore1
INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2016, the State of Georgia executed my client, Joshua
Bishop.2 Until the time of his execution, several successive legal teams challenged his conviction and sentence through the usual channels: direct appeal,
state habeas corpus proceedings, and federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The last hearing on the merits of his case was before a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,3 which accepts appeals
from death penalty cases out of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. In a lengthy
opinion describing the many mitigating circumstances present in Mr.
Bishop’s case, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief.4 This is not uncommon.
What stood out, however, in the preparation of his petition for certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court, was certain terminology in the opinion that
seemed to indicate it had re-weighed evidence offered in aggravation and
mitigation of his death sentence. This was disconcerting, since Georgia is a
“non-weighing” state.5 This error formed the basis for Mr. Bishop’s final
legal challenge—which was ultimately unsuccessful, but which attracted national interest.6 This Article describes the heart of that challenge and explains why the appropriate legal tests matter in such cases: life is at stake.
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Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. J.D., Emory Law School, 2002.
M.T.S., Candler School of Theology, Emory University, 2002. I would especially like to thank the
current and former students who have ably served as research assistants on this issue. These include
Caryn Dreibelbis, Katie Hall, Sara Witherspoon, and Courtney Britt. I would also like to honor the
work of the students participating through the Mercer Habeas Project in the representation of
Joshua Bishop. Dianna Lee, a 2014 graduate of Mercer Law School, provided particular leadership
on the petition for certiorari in his case, and my heartfelt thanks goes to her and to the many others
who so zealously advocated for our dear client.
See Rhonda Cook, Georgia Executes Joshua Bishop for 1994 Murder, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION: METRO ATLANTA / STATE NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016, 9:41 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-executes-joshua-bishop-for-1994-murder/cMjL3hrLCd0XaCk9AEUI3K/.
See Bishop v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification State Prison, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253 (11th
Cir. 2013).
Id.
See infra note 45.
See Maureen Johnston, Petitions to Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 17, 2014, 1:30 PM),
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In the summer of 1994, Joshua Bishop was a homeless nineteen-yearold7 who spent his childhood in foster care, group homes, or on the streets—
manipulated, beaten, and abandoned. Mr. Bishop had always been a “sweet
kid,” but began staying with Mark Braxley, a former lover of his mother’s.8
Within weeks, though he had never before been charged with a crime more
serious than a misdemeanor, Mr. Bishop faced murder charges for the tragic
results of his connection with Braxley.9
These circumstances never provided excuse sufficient to establish legal
innocence of his crimes committed in those summer weeks; in fact, Mr.
Bishop confessed within hours of his arrest and sought to plead guilty. 10
While the question of Mr. Bishop’s guilt was not a difficult one for his trial
jury—hearing his confession, it returned a verdict after only a few hours—it
struggled with whether to deliver a sentence of death.11
During the sentencing phase, the jury heard from several witnesses about
Mr. Bishop’s horrific childhood. The prosecution also played Mr. Bishop’s
custodial confession to participation in the beating death of Ricky Willis, a
man who had assaulted Mr. Bishop’s mother.12 When Willis bragged to others about the assault, Mr. Bishop became very angry and [] beat . . . Ricky
Willis.13 Mr. Bishop then told the police that Mark Braxley—who had a
violent history with Willis—slit Willis’s throat, killing him.14 Mr. Bishop
admitted he helped Braxley bury the body and his statement to police was
consistent with the medical examiner’s testimony indicating Willis had died
from knife injuries and not from the abrasions to his head and face.15
On February 13, 1996, Mr. Bishop was sentenced to death.16
_____________
Years later, in state habeas proceedings, new counsel raised a number of
claims related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.17 Trial counsel testified to their belief and their trial strategy that Mr. Bishop was truthful in his
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http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/petitions-to-watch-the-long-conference-of-september-29part-iii/ (identifying Bishop v. Humphries as a “petition to watch”).
Warden, 726 F.3d at 1250–51.
Brief of Amici Curiae Public Counsel et al. in Support of Petitioner at 4, Bishop v. Humphrey, 135
S. Ct. 67 (2014) (mem.) (No. 13–1345), 2014 WL 2612611, at *4.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 4–5; Warden, 726 F.3d at 1249.
See Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887, 891 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1997).
Warden, 726 F.3d at 1252–53 (noting that the jury deliberated for nine hours before recommending
a sentence of death).
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1252–53. On September 11, 1996, Mark Braxley accepted the State’s offer of a life sentence
with the possibility of parole and pleaded guilty to the murder of Ricky Willis and Leverett Morrison and one count of armed robbery.
See id.
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custodial statement, remorseful for his crimes, and less culpable for the
crimes than his co-defendant, Mark Braxley. Three law enforcement officers
who agreed with these general assertions testified by sworn affidavit in Mr.
Bishop’s habeas proceedings.18
Trial counsel described the officers’ reluctance to testify at trial,19 but
explained he never attempted to compel them to tell the jury about their impressions of Mr. Bishop’s truthfulness, remorsefulness, or limited role in the
crimes.20 The presentation of additional mitigation and context—available,
but never provided to the sentencing jury—was voluminous, including descriptions of Mr. Bishop as desperate for, and vulnerable to, father figures.21
Told of this evidence, a number of the sentencing jurors also testified by
affidavit that they would not have voted for death.22 Nevertheless, Mr.
Bishop’s state and federal challenges were unsuccessful.23 The language in
the Eleventh Circuit opinion, discussed infra, claimed that any errors of trial
counsel were harmless because the new evidence was insufficient to “undermine” the evidence presented in aggravation of the sentence.24
The use and application of that language was troubling.
When states re-crafted death penalty statutes after Gregg v. Georgia,25
which allowed jurisdictions to reinstate capital punishment, some—”weighing states”—promulgated laws allowing juries to impose death sentences
only after determining that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors.26 Others—”non-weighing” states—instructed jurors that they
could return a sentence less than death for any reason or no reason at all,
even after finding a statutory aggravator.27 It is clear that Strickland v. Washington establishes the universal test for evaluating ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. 28 The majority of federal appellate courts, however, do not
appropriately apply the Strickland test for penalty-phase prejudice according
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Id. at 1254–55.
Id. at 1255.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 14–15.
See Warden, 726 F.3d at 1252.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 16–19.
Warden, 726 F.3d at 1253, 1259.
Id. at 1256.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976).
See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 135 n.6 (2006);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193, 197.
The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 135 n.6 (2006).
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“A convicted defendant’s claim that
counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).
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to the underlying states’ capital sentencing statutes. The question explored
here identifies a split among the federal circuits and has not been addressed
by the United States Supreme Court.
This Article argues that it is error, as occurred in Mr. Bishop’s case, for
a federal appellate court to undertake identical analyses of penalty-phase
prejudice in capital cases arising from both weighing and non-weighing
states. Additionally, the Article discusses how the current analysis of many
federal circuit courts errs by improperly “weighing” aggravation against mitigation evidence rather than applying a prejudice test appropriate to individual states’ capital sentencing statutes.29
I. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES
A. History and Background of the Sixth Amendment Test for Effective
Assistance of Counsel
The test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
well-established.30 Since it was decided in 1984, Strickland v. Washington31
has caused consternation for those representing criminal defendants.32 Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall famously (and presciently) warned
about the failures of that test.33
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The first piece to address issues close to the ones discussed in this Article is by Marcia A. Widder,
Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty
Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1343-44 (1994) (“In jurisdictions where the
sentencer is instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate
penalty, the Court has concluded that aggravating factors guide the sentencer’s discretion and, consequently, reliance on an invalid aggravating factor improperly tilts the sentencing balance in favor
of death. In weighing jurisdictions, therefore, the Court has prohibited automatic affirmance of
death sentences that rest in part on invalid aggravating factors. On the other hand, in jurisdictions
whose statutory schemes do not require the sentencer to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court has determined that the invalidation of one or more aggravating factors is meaningless, as long as at least one valid aggravating factor remains to support the defendant’s death penalty.”).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000) (“It is past question that the rule set forth in
Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.’” ) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)); cf. Bill Cristman, Chandler v. United States:
Does the Defense Attorney Have a Legal Obligation to Present Mitigation Evidence in Eleventh
Circuit Death Penalty Cases?, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 564–65 (2001) (noting that the holding
of an Eleventh Circuit death penalty case “seemingly eviscerates” the Strickland test for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1972, 1986–88, 1992 (2005); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 625, 640–45 (1986).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (“The state and lower federal courts have developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance. Today, for the first time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. . . . [I]n its zeal
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In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding.”34 To this end, the Court laid out a two-prong approach to determine whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness”35 and whether, in the case of a trial, “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”36
As “the range of reasonable applications is substantial,”37 “[t]he governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the question to be asked in
assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors.”38 That is, the question of
prejudice is necessarily circumscribed by the specific legislation governing
the imposition of that particular death sentence.39
Strickland’s general rule was, naturally, applied to the Florida case before it: a death sentence that had been handed down after a capital jury found
the aggravating circumstances had outweighed the mitigating circumstances.40 The Court assessed the question of prejudice and found that the
“question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”41
The Strickland standard is unquestionably the law of the land—the baseline standard by which courts are to adjudicate Sixth Amendment claims—
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to survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority makes many other generalizations
and suggestions that I find unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take adequate
account of the fact that the locus of this case is a capital sentencing proceeding.”)
Id. at 691–92 (majority opinion).
Id. at 687–88.
Id. at 694.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
See id. (“In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. . . . The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially
applying the standards that govern the decision.”); see also Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
1243, 1282 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (observing that the district court took into account the death
penalty statute at issue when deciding that counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced the defense), rev’d,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The Court found, in order to show prejudice under the Florida statute, a defendant must prove that
“there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate
court, to the extent that it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695. The former Fifth Circuit analyzed the facts under the contemporary state death penalty
statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. Sess. and Spec. “A”
Sess. of the 25th Legis.). See Washington, 693 F.2d at 1247 (describing the factual and procedural
history of the conviction).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
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but courts should consider those claims in consultation with the relevant state
death penalty statute. “The governing legal standard plays a critical role in
defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s
errors.”42
This Court further explained that “[t]he assessment of prejudice should
proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”43
Weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances is required under the
capital sentencing statute relevant to Strickland.44 The standard that governs
a Georgia capital jury’s decision, on the other hand, does not require a weighing analysis or deliberation.45 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the legitimacy of Georgia’s unique capital sentencing
scheme.46
Literature reviewing the provision of counsel for criminal defendants has
identified problems on a number of levels and for a number of reasons.47
One piece notably claimed that “[w]hile in theory the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be minimally effective,” that was not the practical result:
To avoid overturning convictions in droves, the Supreme Court has watered
down the definition of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, so any “lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.” As too
42
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2017) (requiring both jury and judge to determine “[w]hether
aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist”).
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2017) (requiring the court to find at least one aggravating circumstance to impose the death sentence but not to conduct any weighing); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 864, 873–75, 888–91 (1983) (footnote omitted) (“In Georgia, unlike some other States, the
jury is not instructed to give any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance
aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard.”).
See Id. at 879 (“The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at the definition stage, and
for individualized determination and appellate review at the selection stage. We therefore remain
convinced, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the statute is constitutional.”); Godfrey v. Ga.,
446 U.S. 420 (1980) (reversing one application of Georgia’s death penalty statute but impliedly
reaffirming the statute’s constitutionality); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 454 (2005) (recognizing
that the Godfrey Court had not taken issue with Georgia’s death penalty statute, only with the
Georgia Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in one particular case).
See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1837 (1994) (outlining “the pervasiveness of deficient
representation” in death penalty cases); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel”
in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV 433, 433-36 (1993) (“This Article argues for a narrower
definition of ‘counsel’ that encompasses only those licensed attorneys with the requisite skill and
knowledge to wage an adequate criminal defense.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Kagan Says Poor Defendants Are Entitled to a “Ford Taurus” Defense, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/kagan_says_poor_defendants_are_entitled_to_a_ford_taurus_defense/
(highlighting Justice Elena Kagan’s acknowledgement that “there’s a lot we still need to do” to
improve legal assistance provided to poor criminal defendants and recalling Justice Kagan’s statement that criminal defendants “deserve at least . . . a lawyer who has the skills, resources and competence needed to thoroughly advise a client . . . .”).
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many cases chase too few lawyers with too little funding, the inevitable result is chronic ineffectiveness.48

The provision of zealous counsel in capital and other criminal cases is an
important topic, but not the primary focus of this Article. Under examination
here is whether and how federal circuits—as evidenced by the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of Mr. Bishop’s case—inconsistently apply the Strickland
penalty-phase test for prejudice.49
B. How Capital Sentencing Structures Make a Difference in the Strickland
Analysis
Responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s warning in Furman v. Georgia
“to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups,” states promulgated statutes specifying the factors
to be considered and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence.50 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court specified that “[w]hile the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory
aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death.”51 Thus, in the
wake of Furman and Gregg, death penalty states52 developed statutory
schemes that generally fall into one of two categories: “weighing” 53 and
48
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Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1287, 1288 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1751, 1786 (1999).
This Article represents thorough research into each federal circuit and its analysis of state capital
convictions involving Strickland. This involved review of penalty phase prejudice analysis in hundreds of cases. The focus below is on some of the most illustrative cases and circuits.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976). See also Katie Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Impact of Information Overload on the Capital Jury’s Ability to Assess Aggravating
and Mitigating Factors, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1089, 1094 (2009) (“Aggravating factors
serve two purposes. First, the presence of an aggravating factor renders the defendant eligible to be
sentenced to death. Second, aggravating factors are then compared by the jury to any mitigating
factors in selecting the defendant’s sentence. Recent years have seen an increased amount of aggravating evidence at both the eligibility and selection stages.”).
As of this publishing, the following states do not have the death penalty: Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited August 31, 2017). The
District of Columbia does not employ capital punishment either. Id.
These include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (2017); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4603(a)–(b) (West 1987); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1978); see also Brown v.
Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 221–23 (2006) (describing the way a jury should consider aggravating factors and invalidated factors under California’s death penalty statute); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2015); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (e)(1) (West
2013), invalidated by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 2017); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(3), (7) (West 2006); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9(a), (d) (West 2016); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(c), (e) (West 2014);
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“non-weighing.”54 The majority of states are “weighing,” in which juries
must find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors in order for the defendant to be sentenced to death.55 However, non-weighing
states allow juries to consider aggravating and mitigating factors and the jury

Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 68 (West 1982), invalidated by Commonwealth
v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-101(2), (3)
(West 2013); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2522 (West 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.030(4)(a) (West 2013); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2017); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(b) (West 2012); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.04 (West 2016); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1987); Pennsylvania,
42 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (West 1999); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 3913-204(c), (e) (West 2014); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5)(a)–(b) (West 2016).
54
These include Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (West 2017); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(1) (West 2012); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (1988); Missouri,
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2017); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150 (West 2005);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A27A-1 (1995); Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2013); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 1977); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West
2015).
Some states are difficult to categorize or are considered “hybrid” states vis-à-vis whether capital jurors
are instructed to weigh mitigating and aggravating evidence when determining sentencing. These
include Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(G) (2012) (“At the penalty phase, the defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether
there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. . . . [T]he state may present
any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown leniency including any
evidence regarding the defendant’s character, propensities, criminal record or other acts.”); Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2014) (providing that “the jury shall deliberate . . . [w]hether at least one aggravating factor has been proved . . . sufficient mitigating factors
exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found to exist; and . . . whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment” but stipulating that a unanimous jury must
find both an aggravating factor and “insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh” it); see also People
v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“We are persuaded . . . that the statute
must be interpreted to require that in order to support the imposition of the death penalty, each juror
must be convinced that the mitigating factors, if any, do not weigh more heavily in the balance than
the proven statutory aggravating factors.”); Illinois, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g) (West
2015) (“If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.”); Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (West 2003) (mandating that mitigating factors must be
“sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” in order for a death sentence not to be imposed); Wyoming, see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (West 2001) (providing that the jury deliberate whether
aggravating and mitigating factors exist, and that “[t]he mere number of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances found shall have no independent significance”).
55
Cody G. Winchester, Weighing Death: Is Death Penalty Eligibility “Especially Heinous, Cruel or
Depraved?” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 523 (2016) (“Weighing-state statutes also vary widely in the
number of statutory mitigators that sentencers consider, and some do not have any mitigators at all
. . . . [Legislative] silence indicates the legislature’s intent for the sentencing body to adopt the
broadest view possible to determine what amount of leniency is appropriate. This [] is important
because, although the number of statutory mitigators is consistently lower than the number of aggravators, the statute is actually more expansive. Such breadth is desirable because it gives defense
attorneys the ability to present anything that could call for leniency, reducing the chance a defendant will be sentenced to death. Ultimately, it helps ensure that those who do not deserve to receive
the death penalty are given lengthy prison sentences instead.”).
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may return a verdict for life for any reason or no reason at all.56
While Strickland provides a clear penalty-phase test for prejudice, the
federal courts’ application of Strickland has resulted in uneven and illogical
results given their inconsistent application of the underlying states’ statutory
schemes.57
Several federal circuits—the Fourth58, Fifth59, and Eleventh60 Circuit
Courts of Appeals—routinely analyze penalty-phase prejudice without explicit regard to whether the sentence emerges from a weighing or non-weighing capital sentencing scheme.61
Other federal circuits, however, properly account for the state-specific
weighing/non-weighing instructions underlying a capital conviction.62 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provides a model worth consideration. It
tailors its prejudice analysis to the relevant state’s statutory scheme to “evaluate whether the difference between what was presented and what could
have been presented is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence in the outcome’

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

Nicholas A. Fromherz, Note, Assuming Too Much: An Analysis of Brown v. Sanders, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 401, 404–05 & n.17 (2006) (explaining that in “non-weighing” states, “the jury
weigh[s] any and all mitigating factors against a set of aggravating factors that may or may not
include the factors making the defendant eligible for death, but which, in the event that such aggravating factors do include the eligibility factors, are not limited to them,” and that “[i]n both weighing and non-weighing states, the sentencer engages in a weighing process, balancing mitigating
factors against aggravating factors to determine whether death is warranted. . . . [T]he distinction
lies not in whether weighing occurs, but in what is weighed”).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See generally Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital
Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347 (1995)
(analyzing the impact of applying either a weighing or a non-weighing statute on the outcome of a
case).
Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2005); Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 442–43 (4th
Cir. 2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 691 (4th Cir. 2001); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 292 (4th
Cir. 2002).
Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669, 680–81 (5th Cir. 2013); Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196,
202–03 (5th Cir. 2007); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 519–20 (5th Cir. 1996); Motley v. Collins,
18 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1994).
Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 534 (11th Cir. 2000); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547,
1556–59 (11th Cir. 1994); Cummings v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356–60, 1365–
66 (11th Cir. 2009); Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1313–14 (11th Cir.2008).
See Winchester, supra note 55, at 523 (“Weighing-state statutes also vary widely in the number of
statutory mitigators that sentencers consider, and some do not have any mitigators at all. . . . Even
though a few states have zero statutory mitigators, each either leaves the definition of a mitigating
factor open to include any other factors that call for leniency raised by the evidence, or they simply
describe the weighing function without reference to statutory mitigators . . . . This caveat is important because, although the number of statutory mitigators is consistently lower than the number
of aggravators, the statute is actually more expansive.”).
Research revealed no federal appellate analysis of Strickland prejudice in a capital case in the First
or the Second Circuit Courts of Appeal. See Fromherz, supra note 56, at 403–10 (noting that many
states have now abandoned capital punishment and most death penalty states are “weighing” states;
therefore, some federal circuits only rarely encounter capital sentences or only review those from
weighing states).
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of the proceeding.”63 It is notable, however, that the Ninth Circuit has its
own concerns related to application of appellate precedent on further review
and remand. 64
While there is confusion regarding the difference, and the ensuing significance, between weighing and non-weighing states, the “unique seriousness”65 of a capital trial demands that clarity be given to circuit courts. In
accordance with relevant precedent of this Court, federal appellate courts
considering state-imposed death sentences should take note of the underlying
state’s death penalty framework,66 the role of the jury under that framework,
and the assurance of due process for each capital defendant.67

63

64

65
66

67

Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)); see also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir. 2002); Correll v.
Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2008); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The
aggravating evidence in Hovey’s case was strong, but it was not so overwhelming as to preclude
the possibility of a life sentence. Heinous crimes do not make mitigating evidence irrelevant.”).
Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Affirms That Courts Must Consider Aggravating Impact of Evidence
When Evaluating Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Stankewiz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163
(9th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2139, 2143 (May 2013) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit [has] resolved a
longstanding inconsistency between its own cases and Supreme Court precedent . . . where counsel
fails to present mitigating evidence. . . . But the majority failed to clarify how it weighed the defendant’s mitigating and aggravating factors under this standard, providing lower courts with little
practical guidance on when the balance of likely effects does or does not produce a reasonable
probability that the sentence would have been different.”).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 704 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Weighing states vary in the number of aggravating factors they consider:
Some states have a low number of aggravators, such as Montana, which has only 6; others
have a high number of aggravators, like Delaware, which has 22. Of the 32 states, 15 have
10 or more aggravators. The presence of a large number of aggravators is not necessarily
an indicator of increased application of the death penalty. For example, Kansas and Montana rank very low in executions per capita, whereas Oklahoma—which has only eight
aggravators in its capital sentencing statute—ranks first in executions per capita, and second in actual executions per death sentence. Compared to Oklahoma, both Delaware and
Pennsylvania have high numbers of aggravators; 22 and 18, respectively. Delaware, with
22 aggravators, ranks second in executions per capita and first in actual executions per
death sentence. Pennsylvania, meanwhile, with 18 aggravators, has only executed three
inmates since 1976.
Winchester, supra note 55, at 522–23 (N.B. Several of the states listed and described here no longer
employ capital punishment).
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111–12 (1982) (“[T]he Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. . . . ’[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death.’”) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976));
Zant, 462 U.S. at 873.
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1. A Number of Circuit Courts of Appeal Appear to Conflate the
Analysis of Penalty-Phase Prejudice of Cases Arising from NonWeighing States with Analysis Appropriate to Weighing States
The Eleventh Circuit includes two weighing states—Florida and Alabama—and one non-weighing state—Georgia.68 Eleventh Circuit Strickland
prejudice determinations, however, seem to inappropriately conflate weighing and non-weighing analysis without regard to the statutory scheme of each
particular state.69
The Fifth Circuit, which also includes non-weighing states, Texas and
Louisiana, regularly misapplies the Strickland test in considering penaltyphase prejudice.70 While the Texas capital punishment statute does not require a jury to conduct a balancing inquiry, federal appellate courts regularly
do so on appellate review.71 Particular emphasis on the circumstances of the

68
69

70

71

See supra notes 53 and 54.
See, e.g., Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1268 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating, in reviewing a Georgia
capital sentence penalty phase, that appellate courts must undertake a balancing inquiry to determine prejudice—”[C]ourts must ‘evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both
that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against
the evidence in aggravation.’”) (quoting Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 936 (11th Cir. 2005));
Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding deficiency of counsel prejudiced Georgia
capital sentencing after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,
1165 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding no prejudice in Georgia penalty phase after weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no
prejudice in Alabama capital sentencing procedure after weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043. 1070–71 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Wood v. Allen, 542
F.3d 1281, 1313–14 (same); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1556–59 (finding no prejudice
in Florida sentencing procedure after weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence); Cummings
v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356–60, 1365–66 (same).
The conflation of weighing and non-weighing language is evidenced in Sonnier v. Quarterman,
476 F.3d 349, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2007): “[The] mitigation evidence . . . would have shown some
favorable aspects of Sonnier’s character, after re-weighing the aggravating evidence of record
against it, we do not find that there is a reasonable probability that its introduction would have
caused the jury to decline to impose the death penalty in this case.” See also Ransom v. Johnson,
126 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 1997); Hankins
v. Quarterman, 288 Fed. Appx. 952 (5th Cir. 2008); Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669, 680–81 (5th
Cir. 2013); Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2007); Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d
1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1994) ; Hood v. Dretke, 93 Fed. Appx. 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2004); Pondexter
v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 524 (5th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir.
1984).
See supra note 70 for list of cases. The Fifth Circuit further explained that on review the United
States Supreme Court must “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available
mitigating evidence.” Sonnier, 476 F.3d at 359-60 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534
(2003)); see also Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring “a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984))) (emphasis added).
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crime as compared to available mitigation evidence is indicative of this improper analysis.72
Similarly, although the Fourth Circuit includes states with both weighing
and non-weighing statutory schemes, its Court of Appeals analyzes penaltyphase prejudice without consideration of the differing capital sentencing statutes.73 This is also the case in decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.74
2. The Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal Have Expressed
Concern About the Proper Method of Analyzing Penalty-Phase
Prejudice in Cases from States with Differing Capital Sentencing
Statutes
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed concern about the
lack of clarity regarding review of capital sentencing in weighing and nonweighing states. The Eighth Circuit is comprised of four states with capital
punishment statutes; it includes two non-weighing states—Missouri and
South Dakota—and two weighing states—Arkansas and Nebraska.75
Prior to Brown v. Sanders,76 discussed infra Part III, the Eighth Circuit,
in Rousan v. Roper, properly reviewed state capital sentencing in light of the
weighing/non-weighing distinction.77 Though the particular result in Rousan
would be identical under the weighing or non-weighing jurisprudence,78 it is
impossible to predict the effect of an abandonment of this state-specific analysis.

72

73

74

75
76

77

78

See e.g., Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that certain mitigating evidence is “double edged” and overwhelming evidence of future dangerousness made it “virtually
impossible to establish [sentencing] prejudice.”).
See, e.g., Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying weighing analysis to a Virginia
case, which is a non-weighing state); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1247–48 (4th Cir. 1984);
Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–72 (4th Cir. 2007); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir.
2002); Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2011); Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220,
235 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Note, Criminal Procedure—Confrontation Clause—Fourth Circuit
Finds No Right to Confrontation During Sentence Selection Phase of Capital Trial, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1027, 1033–34 (2015) (noting that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a
jury determination of all facts necessary to render him eligible for the death penalty).
See, e.g., Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring reviewing courts to evaluate
the totality of the available mitigation evidence and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation);
see also Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dept. of Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 600 (3d Cir. 2015).
See supra notes 53 and 54.
546 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (“This weighing/non-weighing scheme is accurate as far as it goes, but
it now seems to us needlessly complex and incapable of providing for the full range of possible
variations.”).
Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 963 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We have long analyzed the effect of an
invalid aggravating circumstance on the constitutionality of a death sentence by first determining
whether the defendant was sentenced in a ‘weighing’ or ‘non-weighing’ state.”).
Id. at 964 n.5 (“We would reach the same result under the previous weighing/non-weighing jurisprudence.”).
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There is also a lack of clarity about how Strickland should be applied in
light of different capital sentencing statutes of the states in the Tenth Circuit.79 This may in part be due to the fact that the Tenth Circuit includes a
number of states with “hybrid” death penalty sentencing statute.80 That federal appellate court is at least explicit about describing the lack of guidance
for review from a hybrid state,81 which indicates an awareness of and desire
to comply with the appropriate application of the facts to the test.
3. Some Federal Appellate Courts, Especially the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Appear to Take Special Care to Analyze Penalty-Phase
Prejudice According to Whether a Sentence Has Rendered in a
“Weighing” Or “Non-Weighing” State
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly applies Strickland and tailors its analysis to whether it is dealing with a weighing state or a non-weighing state.82 The Ninth Circuit is comprised of weighing and non-weighing
states.83 In particular, in the Ninth Circuit the court demonstrates deference
to specific and individual state law, noting that “in establishing prejudice
under Strickland, it is not necessary for the habeas petitioner to demonstrate
that the newly presented mitigation evidence would necessarily overcome

79

80
81

82

83

Some states in the Tenth Circuit, such as Oklahoma, have been defined as weighing by further
analysis on the state death penalty statute. See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d. 810, 816 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Accordingly, the jury must find the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond reasonable
doubt and then must conclude the circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating evidence
presented by the defendant before it may recommend a death sentence.” (citing Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d at 1505-06 n.3; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11-.12 (West 1995))). The Colorado
statute requires the jury to weigh mitigation evidence against statutory aggravators (like a weighing
state) but allows the jury to make a final determination using all available evidence during the final
stage of deliberation. See People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990).
See Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep’t. of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 768 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing Colorado’s sentencing system as a “hybrid” system).
Id. (noting that the Supreme Court “has not specifically indicated whether the Clemons re-weighing/harmless-error analysis or the Zant analysis applies to states having ‘hybrid’ systems like Colorado’s” (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983))).
See e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying correctly the Strickland
test to an ineffective-counsel claim in an Arizona capital sentencing, and finding prejudice after
observing “that, in capital cases, the Arizona Supreme Court conducts an independent review of
the aggravating and mitigating factors, re-weighing them afresh” and that “[a]t the time of [Defendant’s] appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court was also required to conduct an independent proportionality review”); Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Montana’s
mitigation and aggravation standards to the Strickland analysis); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d
1103, 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating an attorney’s performance under Strickland in light
of Arizona sentencing law); see also Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2013);
Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629-36 (9th Cir. 2010); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979,
1000–02 (9th Cir. 2004); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1985–87 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v.
Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1998).
See supra notes 53 and 54.
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the aggravating circumstances.”84 Likewise, the Sixth and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeal Circuit appear to take care to analyze penalty-phase prejudice in light of the relevant state sentencing statute. 85
__________
While some federal appellate courts properly consider penalty-phase
prejudice, the majority of federal circuits require direction about how to apply Strickland’s test without ignoring the underlying capital sentencing
scheme.
II. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ANALYSIS
Federal courts know well and liberally refer to and quote from the ubiquitous Strickland two-part test.86 How, then, could it be possible that federal
courts could crosswise with appropriate constitutional analysis by avoiding
direct interaction with state sentencing statutes? A number of scholars have
noted the difficult position federal appellate courts (and indeed, state appellate courts) find themselves in when analyzing penalty-phase prejudice in
capital cases.87 Cases of this sort include voluminous records with issues of
varying strength and complexity.88 And the breadth of what may be presented in capital sentencing hearings makes it difficult to imagine what impact (if any) new or invalidated evidence may have played in the jury’s considerations.89 Many courts, however, would find it burdensome to remand
every capital sentencing case for new sentencing on the presentation of new
mitigation evidence.90 As a practical matter, many federal courts, unless

84
85

86

87
88

89

90

Lambright v. Schriro, 485 F.3d 512, 530 (9th Cir. 2007).
See e.g., Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 420–29 (7th Cir. 2012) (conducting Strickland analysis in light of Illinois sentencing law); Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2003) (conducting Strickland analysis in light of Ohio sentencing law).
John G. Douglas, Confronting Death: Six Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM
L. REV. 1967, 1972 (2005) (arguing that “the whole of the Sixth Amendment applies to the whole
of the capital case, whether the issue is guilt, death eligibility, or the final selection of who lives
and who dies”).
See, e.g., Widder, supra note 29, at 1372–73.
Paul Marcus, The United States Supreme Court (Mostly) Gives Up its Review Role with Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Cases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1745, 1752–59 (2016); See Michael Mello, “In
the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law’’; Diary of Captial Appeals Lawyer, 24 Vt. L. Rev.
583, 598 (2000)( Discussing the strenuous hours of labor often involved in litigating death penalty
cases)
See Ingrid A. Holewinkski, “Inherently Arbitrary and Capricious”: An Empirical Analysis of Variations Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 241–42 (2002)
(describing the many kinds of mitigating evidence defendants may present).
See Ryan C. Thomas, Not-So-Harmless Error: A Higher Standard for Mitigation Errors on Capital
Habeas Review, 89 WASH. L. REV. 515, 522–26 (2014) (explaining that the jury must be able to
hear and give meaningful effect to the mitigation evidence and give individual consideration to the
facts of the case and characteristics of the defendant).
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very carefully avoiding weighing language and analysis in scrupulous deference to death penalty statutes of the state in which a defendant was sentenced, “reweigh” evidence presented to the jury on post-conviction review.91
Let us return to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for examples and
illustrations. Two recent Florida state cases with capital sentences feature
explicit balancing language, as well they should: Florida is a weighing
state.92 Hardwick v. Florida Department of Corrections explained, “The
State correctly observes that the District Court was required to place both the
aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances in the scales to
appropriately weigh them.”93 Similarly, Barwick v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections held “the Florida Supreme Court was not unreasonable” when it determined that aggravating circumstances would have still
greatly outweighed any mitigating circumstances . . . .”94 Consider, on the
other hand, Hosley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, a Georgia case.95
In examining alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that it must “evaluate the totality of the available
mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in
the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.”96 The court, which ultimately affirmed, discussed extensively whether
the aggravating circumstances “outweigh” the mitigating, using it six times,
in addition to “balance” twice, and “weigh” once.97 Likewise, Lance v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison affirmed a conviction and death sentence,
holding the prisoner suffered no prejudice in lower courts’ analyses of his
Sixth Amendment claim. 98 The court here clearly used “weighing” analysis,
citing cases deriving from Florida as legal precedence.99 All of the cases

91

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
740, 742 (1987); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration [by the
reviewing court] of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976))).
See supra note 53.
Hardwick v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 541, 559 (2015).
Barwick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 764 F.3d 1239, 1251 (2015).
Hosley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1268 (2012).
Id. (quoting Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 936 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 1268–73; id. at 1289–94 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Lance v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, No. 16-15008, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16778, at
*19, *24–25 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).
Id. at *21(“Indeed, ‘[o]ur analysis of the prejudice prong . . . must also take into account the aggravating circumstances associated with [Lance]’s case . . . .’ “At the end of the day, we are required
to ‘reweigh the evidence in aggravating against the totality of available mitigating evidence.’” (first
quoting Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting Boyd v. Allen, 592
F.3d 1274, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010)) (alterations in original).
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cited, including Wiggins, involved death sentences originating from weighing states or former weighing states.100
But does appellate courts’ use of the words “weigh,” “reweigh,” or “outweigh” alone signify that a federal court has employed an inappropriate
Strickland analysis in a case from a non-weighing state? Not necessarily,
though that is an area of concern. Some federal appellate opinions, long and
exhaustive though they may be, do not explicitly reference the sentencing
jury’s instructions, which is not in itself error, but may indicate whether a
court has borne the underlying statute and instructions in mind when considering ineffectiveness or additional mitigation.
Improper or overreaching analysis may likewise occur whether or not a
court employs the actual words “weigh” or “reweigh.” Returning to our example from the Introduction, supra, Mr. Bishop’s federal habeas counsel alleged that trial counsel had failed in a number of ways, prejudicing Mr.
Bishop in the sentencing phase of trial.101 Because mitigating testimony and
physical evidence is particularly important in a state (such as Georgia) where
anything could have persuaded a juror to vote for life,102 questions of attorney error and prejudice are extremely important.
Jury instructions to Mr. Bishop’s sentencing jury—the standard instructions in Georgia—explained: “You may fix the penalty at life imprisonment
if you see fit to do so for any reason satisfactory to you or without any reason.”103 Under Georgia law, there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel presented the officers’ testimony, the jury would have been given the
“any reason satisfactory” needed to vote for a sentence of life. In Mr.
Bishop’s case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals never addressed the
deficient performance prong and disposed of the issue after its prejudice
analysis.104 Specifically, it held the state habeas court’s decision was not
unreasonable because extensive mitigation evidence available (but not pre-

100

101
102

103

104

See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding penalty-phase prejudice due to ineffective
counsel after “reweigh[ing] the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating
evidence” in reviewing a Maryland capital sentencing, a former weighing state under MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2002) (repealed 2013))
Bishop v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification State Prison, 726 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir.
2013).
Heidler v. State, 537 S.E.2d 44, 56 (2000) (“The trial court properly instructed the jury to consider
mitigating circumstances, and that it could impose a life sentence for any reason or no reason at
all.”); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1459 (1985) (“In the current Georgia capital punishment
regime, the sentencing jury has complete discretion to choose between life imprisonment or death
after the finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance.”).
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(c) (West 2009) (“[Without a unanimous jury decision], the judge
shall dismiss the jury and shall impose a sentence of either life imprisonment or imprisonment for
life without parole.”).
Bishop, 726 F.3d at 1255.
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sented) would not have “undercut” Mr. Bishop’s involvement in the murders105 or “undermined in any way the statutory aggravator found by the
jury.”106
The Eleventh Circuit’s legal analysis of Mr. Bishop’s Strickland issue
focused solely on the potential effect presentation of the testimony could
have had on the State’s case for guilt or in aggravation. Whether the mitigating evidence “undercut” or “undermined” the State’s theory of the case is
wholly irrelevant when reviewing the state court’s prejudice determination.107 The Eleventh Circuit’s “weighing” analysis was inappropriate in that
case and in others—inapposite to Georgia’s death penalty framework and to
the instructions received by his sentencing jury. And whether the voluminous and compelling mitigating evidence omitted from Mr. Bishop’s trial
“undercut” or “undermined” the State’s aggravating factors should have had
no bearing on whether the state court was reasonable in concluding that
“Bishop has failed to show how he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
decisions.”108
Unfortunately, it appears that a number of courts overlook a primary
point: the finding of an aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase is
presumed after a guilty verdict.109 The question, therefore, is whether counsel’s error requires a new review of sentencing evidence by a factfinder appropriately instructed about the process of death penalty sentencing.110

105
106
107
108

109
110

Id, at 1255–56.
Id. at 1256.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000) (“Mitigating evidence . . . may alter the jury’s
selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine the prosecution’s death-eligibility case.”).
Bishop v. Upton, No. 5:08–CV–91 (HL), 2010 WL 1781008, at *9 (M.D.Ga. May 4, 2010) (citation
omitted). Under Georgia’s sentencing legislation, “the jury receives no instructions to give special
weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more
significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance the aggravating and mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard.” Simpkins v. State, 486 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Ga. 1997)
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873–74 (1983)). Further, as the United States Supreme
Court explained in Zant, “[I]n Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play
any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of
narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.” Zant,
462 U.S. at 874.
See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510.
See Ingrid A. Holewinski, Inherently Arbitrary and Capricious: An Empirical Analysis of Variations Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 242 (2002) (“Jurors
who are assisted with the evaluation of mitigating factors are less likely to impose death sentences. . . . Proper communication and explanation are essential to ensure that defendants are not
sentenced to death merely due to confusion.”).
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III. BUILDING A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF INCONSISTENT ANALYSIS
A. The United States Supreme Court Should Clarify the Appropriate
Analysis of Penalty-Phase Prejudice in Capital Cases for NonWeighing States
Despite the split among federal circuits and despite what appears—at
least to some advocates and scholars—to be a potential misapplication of
Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the error
of conducting a weighing analysis of penalty-phase prejudice in a capital
case from a non-weighing state. While in Brown v. Sanders111 the United
States Supreme Court considered the impact of weighing invalidated aggravating factors presented in capital sentencing, a different issue is described
here.
The Court has considered weighing and non-weighing structures,112 but
not as to this particular question of the interplay between statutory structure
and penalty phase prejudice.113 While Brown described the weighing versus
non-weighing distinction as still “accurate” and the controlling law of today’s death penalty jurisprudence, it described the scheme as “needlessly
complex” while noting it was developed “relatively early in the development
of [its] death-penalty prejudice.”114 Brown also noted the difference between
a weighing and non-weighing state is not one of semantics—reiterating that
the Court has “held that in all capital cases the sentencer must be allowed to
weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence
against the defendant’s mitigating evidence.”115 Brown, however, addressed
the legal role of sentencing aggravators under the weighing versus nonweighing scheme116; yet, the inverse issue—the role of mitigators—remains
uncharted territory.117

111
112

113
114
115
116
117

546 U.S. 212, 214 (2006).
See Widder, supra note 29 at 1343-44 (“In jurisdictions where the sentencer is instructed to weigh
the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate penalty, the Court has concluded that aggravating factors guide the sentencer’s discretion and, consequently, reliance on an
invalid aggravating factor improperly tilts the sentencing balance in favor of death. In weighing
jurisdictions, therefore, the Court has prohibited automatic affirmance of death sentences that rest
in part on invalid aggravating factors. On the other hand, in jurisdictions whose statutory schemes
do not require the sentencer to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court has determined that the invalidation of one or more aggravating factors is meaningless, as long as at least
one valid aggravating factor remains to support the defendant’s death penalty.”).
Brown, 546 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 217, 219.
Id. at 216–17 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)).
Id.
While the Supreme Court has also used weighing language when addressing prejudice claims from
non-weighing states, it has not yet addressed mitigators. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16
(2009) (addressing prejudice claims from California); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 776 (1987)
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Since Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has considered distinctive issues of weighing versus non-weighing states and effective counsel
in single cases—implicitly recognizing the relationship between the evidence presented to the jury and the role of counsel in the presentation of that
evidence.118 All information given to the jury becomes critical for a capital
defendant in a non-weighing state because the jury can return a life verdict
based on any reason or no articulated reason.119 Strickland itself clearly
notes, “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”120 That case, of course,
originated from Florida, a weighing state.121 Likewise, a number of other
groundbreaking U.S. Supreme Court precedents related to ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases have emerged from weighing states.122 Unless a federal appellate court pays very close attention to the capital sentencing scheme underlying a case heard and decided by the Supreme Court, it
would be entirely possible to quote a case from the highest court in the land
and miss its proper application. And while the Court has come close to
reaching this issue, it has not squarely addressed it.123
It seems incredible that the Supreme Court has allowed errors such as
these to persist, and yet capital litigation is so complicated124 (as is the process of granting or not granting certiorari), there are a number of variables
that could be responsible for this.125 The Court’s decision not to accept a

118
119
120
121
122

123
124

125

(addressing prejudice claims from Georgia); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000) (addressing prejudice claims from Virginia). Like the other constitutional issues the Court has analyzed when treating weighing versus non-weighing states differently, this case presents the first
opportunity to take the non-weighing state sentencing practices into account when articulating the
proper prejudice standard.
See, e.g., Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 145–49, 154 (2010).
The minority of states, however, do not require such specific standards. Georgia is in that minority.
See Ford v. State, 360 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Ga 1987).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2013), invalidated by Perry v. State, 210 So.3d 630 (Fla. 2016).
See e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (emerging from Florida); Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (emerging from Pennsylvania); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
534 (2003) (emerging from Maryland); Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) (emerging from
Alabama).
See e.g., Spisak, 558 U.S. at 145-49, 154.
Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1656–61
(2008) (describing a modern trend toward heightened scrutiny of mitigation investigations in capital sentencing).
See John G. Douglas, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105
COLUM L. REV. 1967, 1970, 1970 n.20 (2005) (discussing the failure of the Court to “put the Sixth
Amendment pieces together” and the general lack of scholarly commentary on the application of
the Sixth Amendment at capital sentencing); see also generally Thomas Aumann, Death by Peers:
The Extension of the Sixth Amendment to Capital Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 845 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly extended the Sixth Amendment to
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case for review has no legal bearing on the strength or weakness of the issues
presented.126 Further, concern about appropriate federal appellate review is
more subtle than, say, an issue present since trial, such as racial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, or judge-issued sentences; there could be a number of
reasons why counsel would choose to proceed on another claim.127
This Article is not arguing mere semantics; Mr. Bishop’s case illustrates
how the weighing state analysis fails to adequately consider the role of a
Georgia jury.128 The simple use of the word “weigh” will not indicate
whether a federal appellate court applied the correct analysis, nor will its
absence; rather, as Strickland explains, the correct analysis requires an evaluation of the explicit considerations of the sentencing statute, the sentencing
jurors’ process, and the likelihood that omitted evidence may have impacted
the outcome of the (sentencing) proceedings.129 The Court has long recognized the high stakes involved in death penalty cases; thus, the proper application of the correct legal rule and subsequent analysis is absolutely critical.130 Academically, this is important,131 and the outcome of the failure, of
course, is an unjust execution.
Although, as discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has experienced its own struggles related to California’s non-weighing capital sentencing statute,132 the sort of analysis undertaken in that federal court could
well be a guide to follow. The likelihood of this Court accepting a model set
by the Ninth Circuit, however, seems low.

126
127

128

129

130

131

132

the capital sentencing phase of trial.).
Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 64-APR J. KAN.
B.A. 25, 30 (1995).
Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal
Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 765 (2000) (discussing how criminal defense attorneys are given broad discretion in their strategic trial decisions).
See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216–18 (2006) (explaining how the weighing state analysis
restricts jurors from considering facts and circumstances relevant to an invalid eligibility factor in
another capacity).
Katie Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Impact of Information Overload on the Capital Jury’s Ability to Assess Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1089, 1096–97 (2009).
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (recognizing that the unique stakes
involved in death penalty decisions demand “a corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”).
See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital
Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 550 (2011) (“While the states can be roughly categorized
into weighing states – which limit the factors that may be considered in aggravation – and nonweighing states – which do not place limits on the factors considered in aggravation – there is a
fair amount of variation in how the states ask triers of fact to engage in this balancing.”).
See Karen Lamprey, Brown v. Sanders: Invalid Factors and Appellate Review in Capital Sentencing, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 743, 745-46 (2006) (“If a jury used an invalid sentencing factor to determine eligibility for a death sentence, the United States Supreme Court requires either a re-weighing of all the factors or a harmless-error review if no mitigating factors are present.”).
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B. Unless and Until the Supreme Court Takes Up This Issue, Advocates
Must Learn About and Continue to Raise This Issue Where Appropriate
Should the United States Supreme Court fail to accept a case on certiorari
and resolve the issue, the next best step is training—both for capital defenders and federal judges. Practitioners from non-weighing states need to be
proactive in advocacy before circuits of appeal, explicit about the correct
review standards, and prepared to raise the issue in briefing and oral argument.133
Where a defendant challenges his death sentence, the reviewing court
should first determine whether the defendant’s conviction was imposed in a
weighing or non-weighing state.134 In Strickland and other cases, the United
States Supreme Court has explicitly demonstrated the analysis appropriate
to a weighing state. In cases originating in a non-weighing state, however,
the general Strickland standard governs, but should be applied consistent
with the state death penalty statute at issue. This more adequately accounts
for the role of mitigation and jury deliberations in non-weighing states because a jury may vote for life for any reason regardless of the weight of evidence.135
The analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in Mr. Bishop’s case and others exposes this confusion. Its penalty phase analysis did not mention Georgia
law, and its opinion tracks that in cases arising from Florida and Alabama
that have entirely different capital sentencing statutes. The Eleventh Circuit
ultimately ignored Georgia’s statutory scheme. Significantly, the problem is
not confined to the Eleventh Circuit, as examples of confusion and conflation
of this issue can be seen in other circuits as well.136 Without guidance from
133

134

135

136

It is worth noting here that fewer death sentences are being handed down nationwide. States are
abolishing death penalty statutes and states that still employ the death penalty are seeing fewer and
fewer death sentences that will need to be challenged through the post-conviction process. Georgia,
for example, has had no death sentences since 2014. See Bill Rankin, Death Sentences Now a
Rarity in Georgia, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/local/deathsentences-now-rarity-georgia/WdQLa49GwzpRLG9XrBiMIM/. Still, in the hundreds of remaining death penalty cases arising from non-weighing states, this may be an issue for federal postconviction review.
Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1368 (1995) (maintaining that the distinction between applying weighing versus non-weighing provisions is of critical importance to the result in a case).
Implicitly, the United States Supreme Court recognized the cumulative impact different new or
different mitigating evidence could make on a jury’s decision in a non-weighing state. See Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 199-202 (2011)
(using a weight of the evidence lens for non-weighing state of California).
This applies to any circuit that includes a non-weighing state. See Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d
738, 746 (2004) (quoting State v. McClure, 342 S.C. 403, 409 (2000) (“We note the evaluation of
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case is more difficult because of
the discretion that is given to the sentencing jury. A capital jury can recommend a life sentence for
any reason or no reason at all.”). See also Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2007);
Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 725–26 (5th Cir. 1997).
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the Court, federal appellate courts will continue to conflate the analysis of
penalty phrase prejudice in cases from weighing and non-weighing states.
Though Strickland itself has its limitations,137 it nevertheless articulates
the foundational standard for Sixth Amendment review. The fact that not all
circuits follow its principle that the state capital sentencing scheme (or “governing legal standard”) defines the parameters of assessment of prejudice is
an issue of concern, not merely from an academic perspective, but a practical
one. The best and clearest course would be for the United States Supreme
Court to accept a case with a procedural posture similar to Mr. Bishop’s and
announce to federal courts that proper penalty-phase prejudice in non-weighing states is the general Strickland standard tailored to the underlying capital
sentencing statute. Without guidance, lower federal courts will continue to
conflate the analysis of penalty-phase prejudice in cases from weighing and
non-weighing states. This is not only academically and philosophically important, but failure to do so allows improper review of the most significant
case a court can review: a sentence of death.

137

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 716–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my view, a person on death row,
whose counsel’s performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be compelled to demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been given a life sentence if
his lawyer had been competent . . . if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the outcome would have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redetermination of his fate.”).

